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‘#MySubjectivation’ explores some of the implications changes in the media 
landscape, including those generated by the development of corporate social 
media and social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, have for the ways in 
which theorists and philosophers create, perform and circulate research and 
knowledge. It takes as its starting point Bernard Stiegler’s claim that, with the 
Web and digital reproducibility, we are now living in an era in which subjects 
are created with a different form of the awareness of time. It proceeds by paying 
special attention to the medium Stiegler himself employs most frequently to 
analyse the relation between subjectivity, technology and time: the linearly 
written and organised, print-on-paper codex text, with all its associated 
concepts, values and habitual practices (e.g. the long-form argument, 
individualized proprietorial author, originality, copyright). Can the ongoing 
changes in the media landscape that are said to be shaping our memories and 
consciousness be understood, analysed and rethought by subjectivities that 
continue to live, work and think on the basis of knowledge instruments 
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originating in a very different epistemic environment? Or is the continued 
reliance of theorists and philosophers on print-on-paper books and journals an 
example of how capitalism’s cultural and programming industries invent us and 
our own knowledge work, philosophy and minds by virtue of the way they 
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Over the last few years a number of radical theorists and philosophers, 
including Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi and Jodi Dean, have positioned digital media 
technologies, and corporate social media and social networks in particular, as 
contributing to the formation of a new kind of human subjectivity. It is a 
subjectivity suffering from attention deficit disorders that is rendered anxious, 
panicked and deeply depressed by the accelerated, over-stimulated, over-
connected nature of life and work under 21st century capitalism.1 Others, such 
as Manuel Castells and Felix Stalder, have been keen to portray the Occupy 
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movement, Arab spring, anti-austerity and student protests as expressive of new 
ways of being human that are markedly different to those generated by 
neoliberalism.2 Yet in the era of Anonymous, Occupy, and the Indignadas, with 
their explicit rejection of the drive toward individual fame that constitutes an 
inherent part of modern capitalist society, and emphasis on non-hierarchical 
forms of organization instead, do we need to critically explore new ways of 
being radical theorists and philosophers too? Ways that are unlike us, at least 
as we currently live, work and think, in that they are not so tightly bound up 
with the culture and logic of neoliberalism? 
 
Significantly, few of the key theorists whose thought provides a framework for 
the study of  the relationship between culture, media  and society have paid 
serious attention to the implications changes in the media landscape have for 
their own ways of creating, performing and circulating knowledge and 
research.3 The majority have been content to operate with norms, conventions, 
practices and modes of production that originated in very different eras. With 
surprisingly few exceptions they are those of the rational, liberal, humanist 
author working alone in a study, library or office. Motivated by a ‘desire for 
pre-eminence, authority and disciplinary power’, to quote Stanley Fish’s 
characterisation of his own ambition as a literary critic, this author produces a 
written text designed to make an argument so forceful and masterly it is difficult 
for others not to concur.4 Claiming it as the original creative expression of his 
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own unique mind, the lone author submits the written work for publication as 
part of a paper (or papercentric) journal or book. Once the work has been peer-
reviewed and accepted for publication, it is eventually made available for sale 
under the terms of a publisher’s policy, licence or copyright agreement. The 
latter asserts his right to be identified and acknowledged as its author and to 
have it attributed to him as his intellectual property; transfers the rights to the 
commercial exploitation of the text or work as a commodity that can be bought 
and sold for profit to the publisher; reserves the right to control and determine 
who publishes, circulates and reproduces the text, how, where and in which 
contexts; and prevents the integrity of the original, fixed and final form of the 
text from being modified or distorted by others. 
 
Yet if the majority of key theorists have remained somewhat blind to the 
implications of changes in the media landscape for their own ways of 
performing knowledge (a landscape that shapes even if it does not determine 
human consciousness), one thinker has paid a lot of attention to the relation 
between subjectivity, technology and time at least: the French philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler. It is to Stiegler’s work that I am therefore going to turn for 
help in order to begin thinking through the relation between digital media 
technologies, temporality, and our ways of living, acting, working and thinking 
as theorists and philosophers. That said, it is impossible to provide a full 
account of Stiegler’s oeuvre here, such is it size and scope. The back cover 
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blurb of the 2009 English translation of Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation, 
refers to his having published seventeen books in ‘the last five years alone’. 
What are we to make of this extreme productivity on his part? Is it in its own 
way an instance of the speed Stiegler links to disorientation and the 
industrialization of memory in this book?  It is a possibility that haunts much of 
what follows which, aware a great deal of work is still to be done  on the many 
issues raised by Stiegler’s philosophy (for all New Formations’ has recently 
published an issue on the subject), serves merely as an initial attempt to 
contribute to any such future study.  
 
 
The Philosophical Impossibility of Unliking Media Technologies in the 
Mind of Someone Living 
 
Building on the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Stiegler argues that the relation 
of the human to technology is one of originary technicity or prosetheticity. 
What this means is that, contrary to the classical Aristotelian view, technology 
(i.e. that which is organised but inorganic, manufactured, artificial) is not added 
to the human from the outside and only after the latter’s birth, as an external 
prosthesis, tool or instrument used to bring about certain ends. The human is 
rather born out of its relation to technology. As far as Derrida is concerned, the 
association of time with the technology of writing means that this originary 
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relation between technology, time and the human can be understood as a form 
of writing, or arche-writing (i.e. writing in general, which is ‘invoked by the 
themes of “the arbitrariness of the sign” and of difference’- as opposed to any 
actual historical system of writing, including that of speech).5   As Stiegler 
asserts in a relatively  early essay, ‘Derrida and Technology’, all media for 
Derrida, ‘beginning with the most primal traces… and extending as far as the 
Web and all forms of technical archiving and high-fidelity recording, including 
those of the biotechnologies… are figures, in their singularity, of the originary 
default of origin that arche-writing constitutes’.6 For Stiegler, however, such an 
understanding universalizes arche-writing and underplays the specificity of 
different media technologies and their relation to time. Instead, he emphasizes 
the historical and contingent nature of this relation. Put simply, because the 
human is born out of a relation to technology, and because time is only possible 
and can only be accessed and experienced as a result of its prior inscription in 
concrete, technical forms, the nature of subjectivity and consciousness changes 
over time as media technologies change. Drawing on the argument of the 
palaeontologist André Leroi-Gourhan, to the effect that the emergence of the 
human species coincided with the use of tools, Stiegler presents this process as 
having begun in the Upper Palaeolithic period, its most recent stage being the 
Web. In ‘The Discrete Image’, another early essay, in this case on the 





- the reproducibility of the letter, first handwritten and then printed; 
- analog reproducibility (i.e. photographic and cinematographic),     
  which Benjamin studied extensively; 
- digital reproducibility. 
 
It is ‘these three great types of reproducibility’, Stiegler insists, that ‘have 
constituted and overdetermined the great epochs of memory’ in the West, 
producing eras in which subjects are created with different forms of the 
awareness of time.7  
 
At this point a similar criticism can be made of Stiegler - and by implication of 
those theorists of digital media who have followed him in this respect, such as 
Mark Hansen and N. Katherine Hayles, whose positions build upon Stiegler’s 
use of the related concept of technogenesis - as he makes of Derrida.8 Just as 
Derrida sees all media as figures of the originary default of origin constituted by 
arche-writing, Stiegler himself argues ‘for a generalised technicity – especially 
as a condition of temporality’.9 From a more strictly Derridean viewpoint, then, 
Stiegler does not do enough ‘to preserve the ontological difference between the 
technical synthesis of time and différance as the quasi-transcendental condition 
of possibility for time’.10 Nevertheless, despite this (and in a sense precisely 
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because of it), Stiegler’s work can be extremely helpful when it comes to 
thinking through the role the changing technical environment, and with it the 
emergence of digital media technologies, plays in the production of human 
subjectivity. This can be demonstrated by turning to his understanding of the 
cultural industries. 
 
To simplify his argument for the sake of economy, Stiegler presents the cultural 
industries as subordinating the subject’s consciousness and experience of time 
to the formalised, standardised, reproducible and controllable patterns and 
routines of their ‘temporal industrial objects’. The cultural industries, and 
particularly the program (radio and television) industries within them, achieve 
this by connecting people and their attention to the same regular radio 
programmes, TV broadcasts and so forth on a mass basis. Accordingly, there is 
too little scope for the event, for singularity - for the ‘welcoming of the new and 
opening of the undetermined to the improbable’, to play on his ‘idea of value 
defined as knowledge’ from Technics and Time, 2.11 Newspapers, for example, 
are described here as being machines ‘for the production of ready-made ideas, 
for “clichés”’, motivated by the demands of short-term profit, whose ‘criteria of 
selection are aspects of marketability’.12 As a consequence, the cultural and 
program industries interfere with the ability of each subject to singularly 
appropriate and transform what Stiegler, following Gilbert Simondon, calls the 
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pre-individual fund, which is the process that results in the psychic 
individuation of each individual. So much so that in a recent essay Stiegler is 
able to show how they function to suffocate desire and destroy the individual:  
 
As heritage of the accumulated experience of previous generations, this 
pre-individual fund exists only to the extent that it is singularly 
appropriated and thus transformed through the participation of psychic 
individuals who share this fund in common. However, it is only shared 
inasmuch as it is each time individuated, and it is individuated to the 
extent that it is singularised. The social group is constituted as 
composition of a synchrony inasmuch as it is recognised in a common 
heritage, and as a diachrony inasmuch as it makes possible and 
legitimises the singular appropriation of the pre-individual fund by each 
member of the group.  
  The program industries tend on the contrary to oppose 
synchrony and diachrony in order to bring about a hyper-synchronisation 
constituted by the programs, which makes the singular appropriation of 
the pre-individual fund impossible. The program schedule … is 
conceived so that my lived past tends to become the same as that of my 





Perhaps one of the most interesting and important things to be learnt from 
Stiegler is that the way to respond responsibly to this ‘industrialization of 
memory’ and the threat it poses to the intellectual, affective and aesthetic 
capacities of millions of people today, is not by trying to somehow escape or 
elude the technologies of reproduction, or become otherwise autonomous from 
them. Originary technicity means there is no human without technology, as the 
‘who is nothing without the what, since they are in a transductive relation 
during the process of exteriorization that characterizes life’.14 Any such 
response must itself therefore involve such technologies. By the same token, 
neither can we proceed in the hope that the mass media of the cultural and 
program industries are eventually going to disappear or be abolished; or that we 
can replace them and the alienating affects of their one-to-many broadcasting 
model with the apparently more personal, participatory, many-to-many (as well 
as many-to-one, and one-to-one) model associated with the dominant digital 
media technologies. Witness the way a small number of extremely large 
corporations, including Amazon, Facebook and Google, are currently in the 
process of supplementing, if not entirely superseding, the ‘old’ cultural and 
program industries with regard to the subordination of consciousness and 
attention to pre-programmed patterns of information conceived as merchandise. 
They are doing so by exposing users to cultural and cognitive persuasion and 
manipulation (often but not always in the form of advertising) based on the 
11 
 
tracking and aggregation of their freely provided labour, content and public and 
personal data. This process is aimed at targeting individual users on a fine-
grained, personalised and, with mobile media, even location-sensitive basis. 
Stiegler presents such technologies as hypomnémata: i.e. forms of mnemonics 
(cultural memory), which Plato described as pharmaka, or substances that 
function, undecidably, as neither simply poisons nor cures. Rather than reject or 
critique them outright, he suggests we need to explore how some of the 
tendencies of which our current economy of the pharmakon is composed can be 
deployed to give these technologies new and different inflections. As he posits 
when arguing for the development of a new critique of political economy as ‘the 
task par excellence for philosophy’ today, this ‘economy of the pharmaka is a 
therapeutic that does not result in a hypostasis opposing poison and remedy: the 
economy of the pharmakon is a composition of tendencies, and not a dialectical 
struggle between opposites.’15  
 
Of course, variations on the idea that reproductive media technologies - 
including corporate (i.e. privately-owned) social media  and social networks 
such as Twitter and Facebook  - are neither simply ‘good or bad, productive or 
distracting, enabling or dangerous’, have been put forward a number of times.16 
With more and more people today accessing the Internet using tethered mobile 
devices – phones and tablets – controlled either by their manufacturers, those 
who provide their operating systems, or the telecommunications companies that 
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operate the mobile networks, some critics have proposed radically unliking 
private, closed and semi-closed systems, including those represented by Apple’s 
single-purpose apps, iDevices and iCloud computing. They have advocated time 
and attention be given instead to those tendencies within our current economy 
which encourage physical infrastructure and networks that are less centralised 
and more open to being continually updated, interrupted, reappropriated, 
transformed and reimagined. The emphasis here is on infrastructure and 
networks that make it easier for users to understand how such media are made, 
‘in order to restart the contract on different terms’ and give users ‘the right of 
response, right of selection, right of interception, right of intervention’, to draw 
on Stiegler’s televised conversation with Derrida.17 The latter tendencies 
manifest themselves in the phenomena of much so-called internet piracy, the 
‘hacktivism’ associated with 4chan and Anonymous,18 as well as in ‘alternative 
free and open source software that can be locally installed’ by a range of 
different groups dedicated to working together to get things done, thus 
generating a ‘multitude of decentralized social networks… that aspire to 
facilitate users with greater power to define for themselves with whom [to] 
share their data’.19  
 
Yet when it comes to considering the relation between digital media 
technologies and our ways of living, working and thinking as theorists and 
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philosophers, a more intriguing question, I want to suggest, is one that often 
remains overlooked or otherwise ignored in academic discussions of YouTube, 
Instagram, LinkedIn, Tumblr, et al. This question concerns the very medium 
Stiegler himself employs most frequently and consistently to critique the 
specific changes in technology that are helping to shape subjectivity in the era 
of digital reproducibility:  the linearly organised, bound and printed, paper, 
codex text. How appropriate is it for Stiegler to analyse and critique such 
changes as if he himself were in the main living and working in the epoch of 
writing and the printed letter, with all that implies with regards to his ways of 
being and doing as a philosopher?  Is Stiegler - like Derrida before him, on his 
account - not in his own way privileging writing, and the associated forms and 
techniques of presentation, debate, critical attention, observation and 
intervention, as a means of understanding the specificity of networked digital 
media technologies and their relation to cultural memory, time and the 
production of human subjectivity?20 
 
Stiegler’s notion of originary technicity and the default of origin undermines the 
Romantic, humanist conception of the self as separate from those objects and 
technologies that provide it with a means of expression: writing, the book, film, 
photography, the Web, smart phone, tablet and so forth. Yet from the very first 
volume of Technics and Time (originally published in French in 1994) through 
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to the 2013 appearance in English of What Makes Life Worth Living: On 
Pharmacology, Stiegler to all intents and purposes continues to act as if he 
genuinely subscribes to the notion of the author as individual creative genius 
associated with the cultural tradition of European Romanticism. He persists in 
publishing books, including a number of multi-volume monographs, devoted to 
the building of long-form ‘arguments that are intended to be decisive, 
comprehensive, monumental, definitive’ and, above all, his.21  In Acting Out, 
for example – which, interestingly, is composed of two short books on how he 
became a philosopher and narcissism respectively – Stiegler repeatedly uses 
phrases such as this is what ‘I call’ ‘primordial narcissism…. the “becoming-
diabolical”…. a tertiary retention….  hypersynchronization’.22 Indeed, at least 
in their compulsive repetition of the traditional, pre-programmed, ready-made 
methods of composition, accreditation, publication and dissemination, his books 
very much endeavour to remain the original creation of a stable, centered, 
indivisible and individualized, humanist, proprietary subject.  
 
Of course, and as I have already indicated, it is not only Stiegler who acts out 
what it means to be a radical philosopher or critical theorist by writing and 
publishing in this fashion. Much the same can be said of Catherine Malabou, 
Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj Žižek – in fact most thinkers of 
contemporary culture, media and society today.23 This point even applies to 
those theorists of digital media who know how to code and produce 
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experimental e-literature, such as Wendy H. K. Chun, Alexander R. Galloway 
and N. Katherine Hayles. How can it be otherwise when academics in the 
humanities often need at least one monograph published with a reputable print 
press to secure that all important first position or tenure? Don’t we all acquire 
much of our authority as scholars by acting romantically as if we were still 
living in the epoch of writing and print? Would we attach the importance to 
Stiegler’s work we do if he had not (single-)authored so many codex books? 
Would he still be considered a serious thinker and philosopher, would most of 
us even have heard of Stiegler, had he operated in less conventional academic 
terms instead, merely as part of the Ars Industrialis association of cultural 
activists he formed in 2005, or any of the institutes he is connected to? 24 The 
latter include not just the Centre Pompidou’s Innovation and Research Institute 
(IRI), which he currently directs, but also the INA (Audio-visual National 
Institute), where Stiegler moved the research department towards signal 
processing and analysis, and IRCAM (Institute for Acoustic and Musical 
Research Coordination), where he did something similar in the field of sound.25  
 
As he put it an interview at the 2012 International World Wide Web conference 





the new dynamics of knowledge needs henceforth that Web issues be 
questioned, practiced, theorized and critically problematized … as with 
the Bologna University during the 11th century, then with the 
Renaissance era, then with the Enlightment and Kant’s question in Le 
conflit des facultés, we are living a significant organological change – 
knowledge instruments are changing and these instruments are not just 
means but rather shape an epistemic environment, an episteme, as Michel 
Foucault used to say.26 
 
Nevertheless, for all his activities with IRI, INA, IRCAM, Ars Industrialis and 
now Pharmakon.fr to develop a new, enlarged organology for the contemporary 
era that includes digital technology, networks and software, the question 
remains:27 if Stiegler is right, and with the Web and digital reproducibility we 
are now living in an era in which subjects are created with a different form of 
the awareness of time, to what extent can this episteme and the associated 
changes in the media ecology that are shaping our memories and consciousness 
be understood, analysed, rethought and reinflected by subjectivities that, to a 
very significant extent, continue to live, work and think on the basis of 





Capital as Academic Subjectivation Machine 
 
To explore this question and its implications for radical philosophers and 
critical thinkers further, let us return to Stiegler’s claim that the task par 
excellence for philosophy now is the development of a new critique of political 
economy that is capable of responding to an epistemic environment very 
different to that known by Marx and Engels.28 Stiegler has recently been held 
up by software theorist Alexander R. Galloway as ‘one of the few people 
writing today’ who approaches Gilles Deleuze’s idea of the control society 
seriously, both ‘as a political and philosophical problem’ and as a critique of 
political economy.29 Yet in one respect at least the control society is something 
Stiegler - in common with the majority of theorists who have alerted us to the 
power of algorithms - does not take anywhere near seriously enough. For if ‘the 
what invents the who just as much as it is invented by it’30- if, in Galloway’s 
words, ‘one must today focus special attention on the way control acts on the 
realm of the “immaterial”: knowledge work, thought, information and software, 
networks, technical memory, ideology, the mind’, in order to follow Stiegler in 
shifting ‘from a philosophy of “what is” [being, ontology] to a philosophy of 
“what does”’ (what affects, what cares, which is a question of practice, ethics, 
politics)31 - then taking Deleuze’s idea seriously as a critique of political 
economy must surely involve paying careful critical attention to our own modes 
of production and ways of living, working, acting and thinking as theorists and 
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philosophers. In other words, we need to consider seriously how the economy of 
control invents us and our own knowledge work, philosophy and minds, as 
much as we invent it, by virtue of the way it modifies and homogenizes our 
thought and behaviour through its media technologies. 
 
What is particularly interesting about Deleuze's thesis from this perspective is 
that it is not just the prison, factory or school of the disciplinary societies that 
are identified as being handed over to the corporation of the control societies. 
So is the institution in which many theorists and philosophers actually work and 
think, namely, the university. To draw on the contemporary UK context, the 
fundamental transformation in how universities in England are viewed, which 
was proposed by the New Labour government commissioned Browne Report 
published in 2010, and which has been imposed by the current 
Conservative/Liberal Democratic coalition (albeit with some modifications 
designed to generate further competition between institutions), provides what is 
only the most recent, high profile evidence of this state of affairs. It entails a 
shift from perceiving the university as a public good financed mainly from 
public funds, to treating it as a ‘lightly regulated market’. Consumer demand, in 
the form of the choices of individual students  over where and what to study, 
here reigns supreme when it comes to determining where the funding goes, and 
thus what is offered by competing ‘service providers (i.e. universities)’,32 which 




The consequences of handing the university over to the corporation are far from 
restricted to a transformation in how the university is viewed as an institution, 
or even to the production of the student as consumer. This process is also 
having a profound impact on us as academics and scholars (i.e. on that part of 
what some radical philosophers call the cognitiarian class which actually 
includes these philosophers themselves). Thanks to the Research Assessment 
Exercise and its successor, the Research Excellence Framework, many 
university professors in the UK are now given lighter teaching loads and even 
sabbaticals to allow them to concentrate on their research and achieve the higher 
ratings that will lead to increases in research profile and the generation of 
income for their institutions from government, businesses and external funding 
agencies. Individuals successful in doing so are then rewarded with even more 
funding and sabbaticals, which only increases the gap between these professors 
and those who are asked to carry a greater share of the teaching and 
administrative load. One result is the development of a transfer market whereby 
research stars are enticed to switch institutions by the offer of increased salaries, 
resources, support and status. At the same time, the emergence of more 
corporate forms of leadership, with many university managers now being drawn 
from the world of business rather than the ranks of academe, has resulted in a 
loss of power and influence on the part of professors over the running of their 
institutions, for all they may be in demand for their research and publications. A 
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lot of institutions in the UK currently require commercial (rather than purely 
intellectual) leadership from their professoriate, in line with the neoliberal 
philosophy that society’s future success and prosperity rests on the corporate 
sector’s ability to apply and exploit the knowledge and innovation developed in 
universities.  
 
Professors and others in leadership roles are not the only ones affected, 
however. Most academics today belong to a ‘self-disciplining, self-managed 
form of labour force’; one that ‘works harder, longer, and often for less [or even 
no] pay precisely because of its attachment to some degree of personal 
fulfilment in forms of work engaged in’.34 This is in part a result of their having 
to take on greater and intensified teaching and administrative loads, due to 
severe reductions in government spending on universities combined with an 
expansion in student numbers, along with the above-mentioned privileging of 
research stars. The increase in the number of fixed-term, part-time, hourly-paid, 
temporary and other forms of contingent positions (instructors, teaching 
assistants, post-docs, unpaid ‘honorary’ research assistants) as we enter deeper 
into a precarious labour regime is another  significant aspect of the changing 
Higher Education environment. The result is a process of casualisation and 
proletarianisation Stiegler has described in a broader context as a loosing of 
knowledge, of savor, of existence, of ‘what takes work beyond mere 
employment’, and as thus leading to a short-circuiting of individuation.35 Yet 
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academics are also working longer  and harder (and faster) as a consequence of 
the increasing pressure to be constantly connected and prepared for the real-
time interaction that is enabled by laptops, tablets, smart phones, apps, email, 
SMS, Dropbox and Google Docs. Mobile media and the cloud mean scholars 
can now be found at work, checking their inbox, texting, chatting, blogging, 
tweeting, taking part in online classes, discussions and forums, not just in their 
office or even on campus, but also at home, when walking in the city, travelling 
by train or waiting at an airport in a completely different time zone from the rest 
of their institution. The pressure created by various forms of monitoring and 
measurement (such as the National Student Survey in the UK) for academics to 
show they are always on and available by virtue of their prompt responses to 
contact from colleagues and students only exacerbates this culture of 
‘voluntary’ self-surveillance and self-discipline. So does the increasing use of 
electronic diaries open to scrutiny, together with swipe card readers that provide 
university management with data on where staff are at any given time. As a 
result, it is becoming harder and harder for academics to escape from (the time 
of) work.  
 
If the university, like the school, is ‘becoming less and less a closed site 
differentiated from the workspace as another closed site’, the same can be said 
of another important aspect of how the control economy and its media 
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technologies is inventing us and our own knowledge work, philosophy and 
minds: academic publishing.36 This can likewise be seen to be undergoing a 
process of transition: from the walled, disciplinary gardens represented by 
scholarly associations, learned societies and university presses, to more open, 
fluid environments.  Witness the emphasis currently placed by governments, 
funding agencies and institutional managers on the more rapid, efficient and 
competitive means of publishing and circulating academic work associated with 
the movement for open access. Publishing research and data on such an open 
basis is heralded as being beneficial by these key players as it facilitates the 
production of journal and article level-metrics for national research assessment 
exercises, international league tables and other forms of continuous control 
through auditing, monitoring and measuring processes (including the REF in the 
UK, the panels of which now include members drawn from the business 
community). It also helps to expand existing markets and generate new markets 
and services. (Tools for metrics and citation indices are frequently owned by 
corporations, as in the case of Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science and Elsevier’s 
Scopus.) The push for open access and open data on the part of governments, 
funding agencies and institutional managers can thus be said to dovetail all too 
seamlessly with the neoliberal philosophy that assigns universities the task of 
carrying out the basic research the private sector has not the time, money or 
inclination to conduct for itself, while nonetheless granting the latter access to 
that research and the associated data to enable their commercial application and 
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exploitation. (This explains why David Willetts, the UK Minister of State for 
Universities and Science, is so willing to support a version of gold, ‘author-
pays’ open access, even though there exist many more responsible  ways of 
achieving open access, as I have argued elsewhere.)37 
 
Further evidence of a shift in academic publishing toward the kind of open and 
dispersed spaces associated with Deleuze’s thesis is provided by the large 
number of researchers who are currently taking advantage of the opportunities 
to acquire authority and increase the size of their ‘academic footprint’ that are 
offered by the dominant corporate social media and social networks. As with 
other areas of the control economy, social networks such as Facebook and 
Google+ are characterized by a ‘compulsory individuality’ (a term Beverley 
Skeggs adopts with reference to reality TV).38 You can’t use a pseudonym on 
Google+, unless you are a celebrity known by such a pseudonym. Thanks to 
their entry procedures, the only way to join and take part in such corporate 
networks is through one’s own personal (self-)profile. By taking responsibility 
on themselves for managing, promoting and marketing their work, ideas and 
charismatic individual, authorial personalities in this way using networked 
digital media technologies,  academics can be seen to be caught in modern 
capital’s subjectivation machine just as much as the workers ‘Bifo’ and 




Capitalization is one of the techniques that must contribute to the 
worker's transformation into ‘human capital'. The latter is then personally 
responsible for the education and development, growth, accumulation, 
improvement and valorization of the ‘self' in its capacity as ‘capital'. This 
is achieved by managing all its relationships, choices, behaviours 
according to the logic of a costs/investment ratio and in line with the law 
of supply and demand. Capitalization must help to turn the worker into ‘a 
kind of permanent, multipurpose business'. The worker is an entrepreneur 
and entrepreneur of her/himself, ‘being her/his own capital, being her/his 
own producer, being her/his own source of revenue' (Foucault)… 
This idea … is the culmination of capital as a machine of 
subjectivation.39 
 
Publishing today is consequently not an activity academics take part in just for 
and at work: with as many as a third of scholars reported to be on Twitter, they 
publish, and act as entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs of themselves, in all aspects 
of their life, in all their ‘relationships, choices, behaviours’. 40  The separation 






Stiegler’s Forgotten Origins 
 
If Deleuze’s idea of the control society is to be taken seriously as a critique of 
political economy and of power relations between the social and the technical, 
then, as Stiegler suggests it is (although, as we shall see, a question mark can be 
placed against just how seriously he actually takes this critique himself), it 
clearly has significant implications for academic work. The manner in which it 
is increasingly being formed, organised, categorized, stored, managed, 
published, disseminated, marketed and promoted now appears very much as a  
means by which the attention of academics is captured and their thought and 
behaviour modified, homogenized and sold to entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, 
shareholders and advertisers. Many of today’s university workers are thus left 
with little time in which they are able to direct their attention free from these 
forms of control.  
 
Faced by this situation, some scholars and academics have looked back to the 
values of the traditional university as offering an alternative to the becoming 
business of the contemporary institution.41 In this context, can the continuing 
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maintenance of the values associated with writing and publishing print-on-
paper codex texts be regarded as having a similarly alternate, oppositional, 
counter or radical aspect - for all they can take on a somewhat reactionary 
appearance in an era in which digital reproducibility, according to Stiegler, 
constitutes and overdetermines the relation between human subjectivity, 
memory and time? To put this question explicitly in the language of Stiegler’s 
philosophy: if ‘technical development is a violent disruption of extant 
programmes that through redoubling give birth to a new programmatics’ (he 
provides as an example the expansion of orthographic writing in classical 
Greece); and if this is something which is itself ‘a process of psychic and 
collective individuation’ (‘contemporary disorientation’ being the ‘experience 
of an incapacity’ to bring about such an ‘epochal redoubling’, according to 
Stiegler); can the writing and publishing of papercentric articles, monographs 
and multi-volume series of books today help to program the epochal redoubling 
of our current technical system of reproduction so as to produce just such a new 
programmatics, thus countering the tendency to subjectivation and 
disindividuation of the economy of control and its cultural and program(ming) 
industries?42  
 
The desire to sustain a discerning critical understanding and analysis of the 
specificity of digital media technologies certainly goes a long way toward 
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accounting for Stiegler’s own continuing substantial investment in writing and 
the printed letter as both a medium and material practice, along with the 
associated forms  and techniques of presentation, debate, critical attention and 
intervention. After all, as far as he is concerned ‘critical thought or reflection’ is 
a ‘fundamental product of the paradoxical double dimension of memory that 
appears with linear writing’ (i.e. the grammatical rules of the production of texts 
and their ‘fundamental irregularities’, the understanding of which renders them 
a ‘test for reason’).43 It is a desire on his part that also helps to explain why he 
continues to describe many of the tendencies that shape cinema, television, and 
the technologies of social networking in pessimistic, poisonous, dystopic, 
moralistic terms:44 because ‘contemporary technical mediation destroys the 
process of communication that once grounded orthographic writing’. It does so 
by rendering the criteria of judgement by which the events to be mediated and 
retained are chosen – and which makes memory precisely a question of politics, 
for Stiegler – that of a pre-judged and pre-decided ‘calculable credit’. (Pre-
judged and pre-decided not least because on the networks the ‘thinking who… 
cannot think fast enough and must automate the process of anticipation’.)45 In 
fact, the overall tenor of his message regarding digital media tends to be quite 
one-sided, even though he stresses at various points that he was interested in 
Web issues before the Web itself existed; and that digital media technologies, as 
well as being part of the problem of the industrialization of consciousness, also 
have the potential to give our current control economy different inflections - and 
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could even provide the ‘framework for an industrial model of change’ that has 
moved beyond the consumer age by generating ‘new attentional forms that 
pursue in a different manner the process of psychic and collective 
individuation’.46 The impression conveyed nonetheless is that it is primarily the 
technologies and techniques of writing, the printed letter and the book 
(facilitating as they do the ‘deep attention’ Stiegler rather too uncritically 
follows N. Katherine Hayles and Nicholas Carr in attributing to them, in 
marked contrast to the supposedly shallow ‘hyper attention’ often associated 
with digital technologies), that, at the moment, really provide a means of 
resisting the subordination of individual agency and subjective thought to the  
formalised, standardised, reproducible  and controllable patterns of the cultural 
and program industries.47 ‘For me writing books is a technic of the self’, he 
declares.48 
 
In keeping with his view of the technologies of reproduction as Platonic 
pharmaka, neither simply poisons nor cures, Stiegler is quite prepared to 
acknowledge that ‘writing can be deployed as a sophistic or disciplinary 
individualization’, as he puts it in a section on the power of writing in Taking 
Care of Youth and the Generations; and that writing ‘as a critical space is 
obviously and simultaneously duplicitous, pharmacological – and thus “critical” 
in that sense’.49 Nevertheless, even when Stiegler does refer to the affirmative, 
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productive, generative potential of cinema, multimedia and digital television, he 
conceives such possibilities in terms that are very much derived from writing, 
the book, literature and notions of literacy. ‘The real problem’, he writes when 
bringing ‘The Discrete Image’ to a close: 
 
is to rethink or think otherwise what Hollywood has up to this point done 
in the domain of the culture industry, to which cinema and television 
belong…Technology is giving us the chance to modify this relation, in a 
direction that would bring it closer to the relation of the literate person to 
literature: it is not possible to synthesize a book without having analyzed 
literally oneself. It is not possible to read without knowing how to write. 
And soon it will be possible to see an image analytically: ‘television’ and 
‘text’ are not simply opposed.50  
 
Now a great artist or philosopher for Stiegler is somebody ‘really specific, 
singular - somebody who is recognized as a singularity who has created a new 
type of circuit on which other people can come and continue the circuits’.51 It is 
a description that applies to Stiegler himself in many respects without doubt. 
Nevertheless, much of what he writes is concerned with the importance and 
value of paying attention and taking ‘care’, together with the need to address the 
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issue of knowledge and its relation to subjectivity afresh in the era of digital 
reproducibility. As a result, the question arises, just as Stiegler, in his account of 
how Western philosophy has excluded its origins with technics, sees Heidegger 
as having forgotten Epimetheus in Technics and Time, 1, is there something 
Stiegler has forgotten (but which, by the very emphasis he places on forgotten 
origins, on paying attention and on taking care, he can help us remember)? Has 
he forgotten to pay enough attention to the fact that the publishing of 
papercentric articles, monographs and multi-volume series of books submitted 
to learned journals and scholarly presses does not take place today outside and 
apart from the domain of the cultural industries, but is itself heavily implicated 
in the control and homogenization of our thought, memory, consciousness and 
behaviour through its media technologies?  In short, is it possible that Stiegler 
has neglected to pay sufficient critical attention to the cultivation of his own self 
and conditions of his own individuation: specifically, the way his subjectivity, 
his way of being and doing a philosopher and academic, is born out of a relation 
to technics and time? I am thinking in particular of that aspect of our rapidly 
changing media environment that is associated with the print journal and book 
publishing industry, and the networks or assemblages of economic, social, legal, 
technological and infrastructural links and connections that help to shape and 
formalize the conditions in which knowledge and research can and cannot be 




Admittedly, Stiegler draws attention to the ‘growing danger’ represented by the 
privatization of the Web and the attentional forms it constitutes. He does so 
because the issue ‘is first and foremost political’, due to the fact that the Web 
has become the new space of ‘the articulation between psychic individuation 
and collective individuation, and the site of fights to control the latter.’52 Yet 
that part of the publishing industry responsible for producing traditional print-
on-paper academic journals and books is hardly free from the danger of 
privatization. Consider the increasing dominance in the English-speaking world 
of the market-led model of a small number of transnational corporations. Reed 
Elsevier, Springer, Wiley-Blackwell, and Taylor & Francis/Informa are far 
more concerned with productivity, efficiency, instrumentality and the pursuit of 
maximum profit than with increasing circulation and making knowledge and 
research available to those who need it. Indeed, according to one newspaper 
headline they make Rupert Murdoch look like a socialist.53 Evidence their 
already extremely high and still increasing journal subscription charges, for 
those in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) 
especially;54 the ‘Big Deal’, multi-year, contract bundling strategies, which 
insist institutional libraries buy large numbers of publisher-generated packages 
of journals, and which prevent institutions cancelling subscriptions to even a 
single title; and the protection of copyright and licensing restrictions, not least 
through their support for measures such as SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and 
PIPA (Protect IP Act) in the US. Such policies led to an ‘Academic Spring’ in 
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2012, whereby over 12,000 academics signed a public petition protesting 
against the business practices of the largest of these mega-publishers, Elsevier 
(reported to make €724 million annual profits on its journals alone). In 
contributing to the petition, academics pledged not to support Elsevier journals, 
either by publishing in them or by undertaking editorial and peer-review work 
for them, unless Elsevier withdrew its support for the Research Works Act, 
aimed at curbing government mandated open access policies in the US.55 More 
recently, there has been a call to boycott both Taylor & Francis and Routledge if 
their parent company, Informa plc, does not bring down its journal subscriptions 
charges and pay the UK Exchequer the approximately £13 million lost to the 
treasury as a result of its 2009 decision to become a Jersey company domiciled 
in Zug, the canton with the lowest rate of taxation in Switzerland.56 (Informa 
can thus be placed alongside Amazon, Apple, Facebook, eBay and Google on 
the list of companies that aggressively avoid paying the standard rate of 26% 
corporation tax in the UK.) With over ‘half of Informa’s total annual operating 
profit… derived from academic publishing:  £85.8 million’ in 2010, and its 
journals alone providing ‘gross profit margins of over 70 per cent’, such a 
boycott would have consequences for some of the most highly respected titles 




The related ‘dismantling’ of the kind of enclosed, disciplinary publishing 
organisation designed more to serve charitable aims and the public good –
scholarly associations, learned societies, university presses, non-profit and not-
for-profit publishers – provides still further evidence of the dangers of 
privatisation facing that part of the publishing industry responsible for 
producing traditional print-on-paper academic journals and books.58 The 
already high and still increasing costs of journal subscriptions, combined with 
cuts to library budgets, subsidies and other sources of funding, has ‘strangled 
libraries and led to fewer and fewer purchases of books/monographs’.59 This 
has produced a ‘monograph crisis’, which is shorthand for the way the already 
uncertain sustainability of the print monograph is being placed at further risk by 
the ever-decreasing sales of academic books.60 The fall in demand for academic 
monographs has in turn resulted in presses producing smaller and shorter print 
runs. As a result, those volumes that are published are not distributed as widely 
as they may have been in the past, with many going out of print after eighteen 
months.61 Presses have also tended to favour publishing monographs from 
established academics who already have a strong readership, if not intellectual 
stars, rather than developing the next generation of scholars, whose sales are 
initially likely to be low, yet who need to publish a research-led volume 
nonetheless if they are to get a foot on the career ladder and acquire that all 
important first full-time position. Traditional print scholarly publishing cannot 
therefore be said to be explicitly dedicated to promoting the longevity, heritage 
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and intra-generational transmission from old to young – a process that for 
Stiegler forms an integral part of the production and selection of pre-individual 
funds. 
 
So hostile has the situation for publishing organizations designed to serve the 
long-term public good become that many of them are being forced to open up 
their walled gardens to the market and operate as if they were profit-maximising 
businesses themselves. In fact a good number of them are being handed over to 
the corporations, either in part or in whole.62 They are thus finding themselves 
in the position of having to make decisions about what to publish (and 
consequently of having a major say in who gets to have a career as an academic, 
researcher, theorist or philosopher and who does not) more on the basis of the 
market and a given text’s potential value as a commodity, and less on the basis 
of its quality and value as a piece of peer-reviewed, properly referenced 
disciplinary scholarship and research. Some publishers are even moving much 
of their focus away from advanced level, full-length research monographs – 
especially those perceived as being radical, experimental, inter-disciplinary or 
avant-garde, or which deal with areas of thought regarded as particularly 
difficult, specialized or obscure – to concentrate on text books, readers, 
introductions, reference works and more fashionable, commercial, marketable 
titles. There has been a recent boom in the UK and US, for example, in short 
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academic/trade books focusing on particular films and TV programmes, such as 
Lost in Translation and Dr Who, scholarly publishers thus tying themselves 
ever closer to the cultural industries and the system they form ‘with industry as 
such, of which the function consists in manufacturing consumption patterns by 
massifying life styles’.63  
 
When it comes to the threat of privatization and fights to control the space of 
articulation between psychic individuation and collective individuation, then, 
‘print’ and the ‘Web’ cannot be simply contrasted in terms of an offline-online 
dialectic. Concepts, values and habitual practices inherited from the era of 
writing, the book, and especially the industrialisation of printing which took 
place from the middle of the 18th century onwards – the indivisible and 
individualized proprietorial author, mass printing, uniform multiple-copy 
editions, ‘fixity’, the long-form argument, originality, author’s rights, copyright 
and so on – are far from providing an unproblematic means of countering the 
becoming business of the contemporary university. In fact, these historically 
inherited concepts, values and practices also constitute some of the main ways 
in which knowledge, research and thought are being commodified and 
corporatized by publishers of academic work; publishers whose business 
models nowadays very much depend on turning even the publicly funded labour 




Nevertheless, as Dymitri Kleiner makes clear, authors and artists ‘continue to be 
flattered by their association with the myth of the creative genius, turning a 
blind eye to how it is used to justify their exploitation and expand the privilege 
of the property-owning elite.’ It is a state of denial and delegation of decision-
making (it could even be called cowardly in Stiegler’s language) that has 
profound consequences for how we live, work, act and think as theorists and 
philosophers: 
 
Copyright pits author against author in a war of competition for 
originality. Its effects are not just economic; copyright also naturalizes a 
certain process of knowledge production, de-legitimizes the notion of a 
common culture, and cripples social relations. Artists are not encouraged 
to share their thoughts, expressions and works, or to contribute to a 
common pool of creativity. Instead, they are compelled to jealously guard 
their ‘property' from others who they view as potential competitors, spies 
and thieves lying in wait to snatch and defile their original ideas.64  
 
From this point of view (not to mention that of Anonymous, Occupy, and the 
Indignadas with which we began), many of the tendencies of which the current 
political economy of philosophy and theory is composed appear as yet another 
branch of the contemporary cultural industries: not just as some theorists and 
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philosophers managing to ‘individuate themselves more intensely than others, 
and in doing so contribute more than others to the collective individuation’;65 
but as some theorists and philosophers also acting as entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurs of themselves, as Lazzarato puts it,  to market and promote their 
texts, and make sure that the original ideas they contain (e.g. concerning object-
oriented philosophy, new materialism, and so forth) are attributed to them as 
their (intellectual) property, thus both enclosing and branding these texts and 
ideas by association with a proper name.66 If we do follow Stiegler in taking the 
idea of the control society seriously, we can see that they are likewise engaged 
in ‘a war of competition for originality’, implicitly and explicitly fighting with 
other critical thinkers over the ‘modulating principle of individual performance 
and merit’ which ‘runs through each’ (as measured by the amount and quality of 
publications, keynotes, and other indicators of reputation, impact, influence and 
esteem), in order to gain advantage in the struggle for publishing opportunities, 
book contracts, jobs, promotion, grants, sabbaticals, support, resources, 
attention, recognition, fame.67 
 
All of which raises a number of questions regarding how Stiegler acts out what 
it is to be a radical philosopher – for all he is frequently operating across the 
different publishing and academic systems of the English and French-speaking 
worlds. For in this respect academic monographs also appear as machines for 
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‘the production of ready-made ideas, for “clichés”’, whose ‘criteria of selection 
are aspects of marketability’. Monographs, too, are a means of standardizing 
and controlling thought, memory and behavior (e.g. regarding authorship, 
originality, author’s rights, copyright, intellectual property), ‘through the 
formatting and artificial manufacturing of desires’ of the individual theorist or 
philosopher, including those for pre-eminence, authority and disciplinary 
power.68  Such desires (or drives, since ‘a desire presupposes a singularity’, for 
Stiegler)  do much to explain the situation whereby the majority of even 
politically radical academic authors are willing to turn a blind eye and concede 
to the insistence of publishers that the rights to turn their text into a commodity 
that can be bought and sold for profit be transferred to them: because in 
exchange the author will have their work edited, copy-edited, proofed, typeset, 
formatted, designed, published, distributed, marketed, promoted and sold, and 
thus hopefully read, recognized and engaged with by others. In continuing to 
invest his time, care and attention so heavily in the writing and publishing of 
conventional print codex books can Stiegler be said to be exhibiting some of the 
very herd-like behavior, the ‘generalised herdification’, he condemns the 
cultural and program industries for producing in consumers in his essay on 
‘How the Cultural Industry Destroys the Individual’? Is this not a variation on 
the ‘liquidation of the exception’? By being deprived of their individuality in 
this fashion, are even radical theorists and philosophers such as Stiegler – like 
the consumers of hyper-industrial capitalism – ‘lacking becoming, that is, 
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lacking a future’?69 In short, is there insufficient scope here too for the event, 
for singularity, for the ‘welcoming of the new and opening of the undetermined 
to the improbable’?  
 
 
Wanted: Radically New Ways of Being Theorists and Philosophers  
 
If Stiegler is right, then, and if, with the Web and digital reproducibility, we 
have indeed embarked on a ‘radically new stage of the life of the mind whereby 
the whole question of knowledge is raised anew’, this clearly has implications 
for our understanding of digital media technologies.70 Just as importantly, it also 
has significant implications for our own ways of creating, performing and 
circulating knowledge and ideas as theorists and philosophers. Not least, it 
suggests we need to be open to forms and techniques of analysis and critique 
that do not privilege writing and the associated acting out of the self as 
somehow separate from those technologies that provide it with a means of 
expression. Rather, it requires us to be open to what I would understand as more 
ethical and political forms of analysis and critique that welcome the new by 
helping to generate subjectivities that are very different to how we currently 
live, work, act and think. This includes ways of being theorists and philosophers 
that depart from the self-disciplining neoliberal model of the entrepreneurial 
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academic associated with corporate social media and social networks. However, 
it also includes ways of being that are different from the traditional, Romantic, 
humanist, liberal model, with its enactment of clichéd, ready-made ideas of 
authorship, originality, the book, intellectual property and copyright. For in 
their own ways both of these models are involved in the subordination of our 
agency and consciousness to the calculable, controllable, pre-programmed 
patterns and routines of the contemporary cultural industries. The question is, of 
course, what forms might such different ways of creating, performing and 
circulating theory and philosophy take? Would they even be recognizable as 
theory and philosophy?  
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